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INTRODUCTION
“The [Telephone Consumer Protection Act] does not
and was not intended to stop every type of call. . . . [I]t
was limited only to calls made using an autodialer or an
artificial or prerecorded voice.”1
Americans are expected to receive over 48 billion robocalls in 2021;
if you got one, you are in good company.2 Despite being irritants,
robocalls’ pervasive nature has unintended—and sometimes lifethreatening—consequences. For instance, one New Hampshire woman,
awaiting a life-saving liver transplant, received a call from an unknown
Florida number and did not answer, believing it to be another robocall.3
As it turned out, it was a robocall, but a robocall from Massachusetts
General Hospital notifying her that a matching liver had been found for
transplant.4 If not for the voicemail identifying the caller as the hospital,
she likely would not have known the important nature of the call.5 Despite
those dramatic turn of events, situations like this frequently arise all over
the United States. To make matters worse, the number and frequency of
robocalls have increased substantially over the last few years.6
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA or the Act)
was enacted by Congress to address consumers’ concerns of abusive
telemarketers, specifically in restricting communications by use of certain
technology, such as an “automated telephone dialing system”
(autodialers).7 In the last decade, circuit courts have struggled with how to
interpret the definition of an autodialer: broadly or narrowly? This struggle
was only further exacerbated when the Federal Communication
Commission’s (FCC) 2015 Order,8 which built upon previous Orders that
1. Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau Issues Declaratory Ruling in P2P Alliance
Petition for Clarification, 35 FCC Rcd. 6,526 (8), at 4, ¶ 12 (adopted June 25, 2020),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/cgb-issues-declaratory-ruling-p2p-alliance-petition [hereinafter FCC
2020 Order] [https://perma.cc/Q8MZ-3C6J].
2. Jeff John Roberts, You Aren’t Alone: Why Americans Will Receive 48 Billion Robocalls This
Year, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/02/27/scam-calls-robocalls-phone-scamscar-warranty-calls-traced-act/ [https://perma.cc/85HZ-DNY9].
3. Shawne K. Wickham, Manchester Mom Recovering After Successful Liver Transplant, N.H.
UNION LEADER (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.unionleader.com/news/health/manchester-momrecovering-after-successful-liver-transplant/article_f82c63b5-a264-5d07-9723-ad051a9510f8.html
[https://perma.cc/5JCA-3AKX].
4. Id.
5. See Elaine S. Povich, Legit Robocalls Get Snared in Crackdown on Scams, STATELINE (Aug.
28, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/08/28/legitrobocalls-get-snared-in-crackdown-on-scams [https://perma.cc/HKY6-Q54Z].
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part I.
8. See generally About the FCC, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about/overview
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interpreted the autodialer provision, was struck down by the D.C. Circuit
in ACA International v. FCC.9 In response, the Second and Ninth Circuits
continued to interpret the autodialer provision broadly,10 while the Third,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits interpreted it narrowly.11 The FCC was
hesitant to communicate any further interpretations on the TCPA,
specifically to the autodialer provision, and chose to wait until the United
States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid.
On April 1, 2021, the Court decided Duguid and applied a textualist
approach12 to interpret the scope of technology the autodialer provision
encompasses.13 The Court’s decision will no doubt impact future
consumers who will be left without recourse from companies that have
found ways around the autodialer requirements.
This Note argues that the applicability of the TCPA’s autodialer
provision should be interpreted broadly to include calls made on many
types of dialing equipment. This broad interpretation would account for
both the advancement of technology and the policy interests of consumers.
Part I of this Note offers a brief history of the TCPA and autodialers.
Part II examines the FCC’s Orders that interpret the TCPA’s autodialer
provision, and Part III assesses the varying interpretations of the provision
[https://perma.cc/KD8U-RQWX] (“The [FCC] regulates interstate . . . communications by radio,
television, wire, satellite, and cable in all [fifty] states . . . and enforc[es] America’s communications
law and regulations.”).
9. ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that the FCC’s “interpretation
of the [TCPA] statute . . . is an unreasonabl[e], and impermissibly, expansive one.”); see also
Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining that when the “D.C.
Circuit struck down the 2015 FCC interpretation in ACA International v. FCC, . . . [it] did not leave
prior FCC Orders intact”).
10. See King v. Time Warner Cable Inc., 894 F.3d 473, 481 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that the term
“capacity” in the Act’s definition should be interpreted to mean that “a qualifying autodialer should
be interpreted to refer to a device’s current functions, absent any modifications”); Marks v. Crunch
San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2018) cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 1289 (2019) (holding
that the definition of an autodialer is ambiguous and the statute provision should be construed as
including “devices with the capacity to dial stored numbers automatically”).
11. See Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 629 F. App’x 369, 373 nn.1, 2 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that
an autodialer only applies to a message that is sent by a system that has the capacity to generate
numbers randomly or sequentially; to store or produce those numbers; and has the capacity to dial
those numbers); Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 464–69 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding “that the phrase ‘using a
random or sequential number generator’ describes how the telephone numbers must be ‘stored’ or
‘produced,’ and “the capacity to generate random or sequential numbers is necessary to the statutory
definition”); Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F.3d 1301, 1306–12 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding
that a device that simply stores and dials telephone numbers is not an [autodialer]).
12. A textualist approach or textualism is regarded as a “strict or rigid adherence to a text,” such
as the U.S. Constitution and was championed by the late United States Supreme Court Justice, Antonin
Scalia. MERRIAM WEBSTER, TEXTUALISM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/textualism
[https://perma.cc/F48Y-9M7E]. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1984), for an
in-depth examination of the six identified modes of constitutional argument that have been used by
the United States Supreme Court.
13. See Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169–70 (2021).
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by the circuit courts. Part IV reviews the general facts and procedural
history of Duguid, and the Court’s interpretation of the autodialers
provision. Last, Part V examines current efforts offered by Congress and
potential next steps for consumers. This Note concludes by arguing that
Congress must use its power to amend the provision to increase clarity and
reflect the significant advancements in technology—advancements that
legislators in 1991 could not have surmised.
I. HISTORY OF THE TCPA AND THE AUTOMATED
TELEPHONE DIALING SYSTEM
The TCPA was created to “protect the privacy interests of residential
telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated
telephone calls[.]”14 An “autodialer” is defined as “equipment which has
the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using
a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.”15
In the 1990s, telemarketers used a single autodialer to cause upwards
of 1,000 landline phones to ring. The autodialer delivered a prerecorded
voice message16 that could not be stopped when a consumer hung up the
phone, but instead required the listener to listen to the entire prerecorded
message before using the landline again.17
Despite the advancements in technology, the definition of what
constitutes an autodialer has not been revised since the TCPA’s enactment
in 1991.18 Until recently, the concern over what type of device or
equipment meets the statutory definition was subject to different
interpretations based on the volume of complaints filed with the FCC each
year by consumers.19 Thirty years since its enactment, the TCPA has
weathered the tide of technological advancement with few amendments
and three important exceptions: calls made using an autodialer (1) for
“emergency purposes”; (2) “with the prior express consent of the called
14. S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A), (B).
16. S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 2 (1991).
17. See 137 Cong. Rec. H35, 305-06 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Roukema)
(explaining the story of a young New York mother’s “sheer terror” when she tried calling an
ambulance for her child and “picked up the phone only to find it occupied by a computer call that
would not disconnect”).
18. Compare Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394,
with 47 U.S.C. § 227.
19. See, e.g., CONSUMER COMPLAINTS DATA - UNWANTED CALLS, FCC: CONSUMER INQUIRIES
AND COMPLAINTS DIVISION (2021), https://opendata.fcc.gov/Consumer/Consumer-Complaints-DataUnwanted-Calls/vakf-fz8e [https://perma.cc/WU6G-2XXG]; see also The FCC’s Push to Combat
Robocalls & Spoofing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/spoofed-robocalls [https://perma.cc/WM2XZKRC]. The FCC estimates that it receives 200,000 complaints from American consumers each year,
which accounts for 60% of all complaints it receives per year.
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party”20; or (3) “to collect a debt owed to[,] or guaranteed by[,] the United
States” (the “government-debt exception”).21 The penalty for calls made
using an autodialer not within any of these exceptions is a minimum of
$500 per violation.22
In July 2020, however, the Supreme Court heard Barr v. American
Association of Political Consultants, Inc. and struck down the
government-debt exception for violating the First Amendment.23 Instead
of striking down the entire TCPA, the Court chose to sever and strike only
the exception.24 Following Barr, many consumer advocates argued that
since Congress did not take any action to invalidate or amend the TCPA
that meant Congress tacitly agreed with the FCC’s expansive
interpretation of what constitutes an autodialer and how the Court chose
to interpret it.25 Three days after its decision in Barr, the Court granted
certiorari in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid to resolve the circuit split on
whether the TCPA’s autodialer provision applies broadly to calls made on
many types of dialing equipment or is limited to calls made on equipment
from the early 1990s—equipment rarely in use today.26 The Court’s
decision on this matter is of great importance because companies, like
Facebook, that place high volumes of automated calls, texts, or
notifications can avoid liability under the autodialer provision when using
cell phones or other similar, modern technology that do not “store” or
“produce” numbers using a “random or sequential number generator.”27
II. THE FCC’S INTERPRETATION OF AN AUTODIALER
The TCPA vests authority to the FCC to promulgate regulations in
accordance with the TCPA.28 Under the Hobbs Act, federal courts are
20. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (2010).
21. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 301(a)(1)(A), 129 Stat. 584, 588; 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
23. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2356 (2020) (holding that the
government-debt exception violated the First Amendment because it impermissibly favored debtcollection speech over political or other speech).
24. Id. The Court’s decision concluded that the Act continues to prohibit political consultants
and debt collectors from making unsolicited robocalls to American’s cellphones and offered a glimpse
into the careful analysis the Court uses when considering exceptions to the Act.
25. See Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining
that Congress did not re-enact the Act in 2015, but merely offered an amendment to the Act itself,
which has nothing to do with the issue of what an autodialer ought to be defined as).
26. Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in part, 141 S. Ct.
193 (2020). The question on appeal was whether the definition of an autodialer encompassed any
device that could ‘store’ and ‘automatically dial’ telephone numbers, even if the device did not use a
random or sequential number generator.
27. Facebook, Inc., v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021).
28. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2).
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required to adopt FCC interpretations unless there is a direct appeal against
an FCC order.29 Essentially, this means that while the FCC offers guidance
through its Declaratory Rulings on issues related to the TCPA, if a federal
court were to directly appeal the FCC’s interpretation of the statute, then
federal courts are not required to follow the FCC’s interpretation. This was
recently seen in ACA International v. FCC.30
From 1992 to 2003, the FCC followed the statutory definition of an
autodialer without issuing any modifications.31 In 2003, the FCC authored
its first interpretation of the autodialer provision in response to the rise of
predictive dialers (utilized by telemarketers) and significant advancements
in technology.32 The FCC interpreted the statutory definition of an
autodialer to include predictive dialers—telephone software that dials
telephone numbers it has stored or can produce, until a call is answered
and then transferred to an agent.33
In updating its interpretation, the FCC relied on the statutory
language and legislative history of the TCPA to infer that Congress had
anticipated the FCC would need to consider changes in technology when
interpreting the TCPA.34 The automated telemarketing devices of the
1990s were capable of only dialing random or sequential blocks of
numbers, which were not programmed. Predictive dialers, on the other
hand, are capable of automatically dialing from a preprogrammed list of
numbers that are stored in the device or downloaded from a database.35
The FCC’s 2003 Order suggested that any device that operates like a
predictive dialer and could be configured for that purpose has the capacity
to meet the statutory definition of an autodialer.36
29. Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining how the
federal statute, the Hobbs Act, gives federal appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction to abrogate a federal
agency’s order).
30. See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (invalidating the FCC’s 2015
Declaratory Ruling and removing any deference owed to the views of the FCC).
31. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd.
8,752, 8,755 n.6, 8,792 (1992) [hereinafter FCC 1992 Order].
32. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd.
14,014, 14,017 (2003) [hereinafter FCC 2003 Order].
33. The FCC defined predictive dialers as “equipment that dials numbers and, when certain
computer software is attached, also assists telemarketers in predicting when a sales agent will be
available to take calls. The hardware, when paired with certain software, has the capacity to store or
produce numbers and dial those numbers at random, in sequential order, or from a database of
numbers.” Id. at 14,091–92. Consideration of the predictive dialer against the statutory definition of
an autodialer included examining whether the equipment was “automatic” and whether it had the
“capacity” to function in the two relevant ways.
34. Id.; see 137 Cong. Rec. S18,784 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (“The FCC is given the
flexibility to consider what rules should apply to future technologies as well as existing
technologies.”).
35. FCC 2003 Order, supra note 32, at 14,090.
36. Id. at 14,090–91.
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In 2008, the FCC issued an Order in response to a petition filed by
ACA International (the Association of Credit and Collection
Professionals) which sought “clarification that the prohibition against
autodialed or prerecorded calls to wireless telephone numbers . . . does not
apply to creditors and collectors when calling wireless telephone numbers
to recover payments . . . [from] consumers.”37 The FCC acknowledged
“that [while] a predictive dialer constitutes an [autodialer] and is subject
to the TCPA’s restrictions on the use of autodialers,” creditors may still
use predictive dialers to call wireless phones if the number was provided
by the consumer with an existing debt.38
Four years later, the FCC again updated its interpretation of the
definition of an autodialer. The FCC’s 2012 definition included “any
equipment that has the specified capacity to generate numbers and dial
them without human intervention39 regardless of whether the numbers are
randomly or sequentially generated or come from calling lists.”40
The FCC’s subsequent 2015 Order endorsed Congress’s intention for
a broad interpretation of what constitutes an autodialer.41 This Order
suggested that a device “need only have the ‘capacity’ to dial random and
sequential numbers, rather than a ‘present ability’ to do so[,]”42 and the
developments in technology, such as pairing dialing equipment with
predictive dialing software, “ha[d] not changed . . . [a device’s] capacity
to dial numbers without human intervention.”43 The FCC explained that
the basic function of an autodialer is its ability to dial numbers without
human intervention, but a device could still qualify as an autodialer even
if it alone—without the use of predictive software—cannot dial numbers
without human intervention.44
In response, eleven entities filed separate challenges seeking review
of the FCC’s 2015 Order. In the consolidated case, ACA International v.
FCC, the D.C. Circuit held that the 2015 Order contradicted the standard
37. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd.
559, 563 (2008) [hereinafter FCC 2008 Order].
38. Id. at 566.
39. The term “‘human intervention’ does not appear in the TCPA and only became part of the
TCPA[‘s] lexicon following the FCC’s massive expansion of the [autodialer] definition in its 2015
[Order].” Eric J. Troutman, Facebook is Out!: The 6 Most Critical Take Aways–and One Most
Important Question–Following the Supreme Court’s Huge TCPA ATDS Ruling Today, NAT’L L. REV.
(Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/facebook-out-6-most-critical-take-aways-andone-most-important-question-following [https://perma.cc/GL2W-8H6N].
40. In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 27 FCC Rcd.
15,391, 15,392 n.5 (2012) (emphasis added).
41. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd.
7,961, 7,973–74 ¶¶ 14, 15 (2015) [hereinafter FCC 2015 Order].
42. Id. at 7,974 ¶ 15.
43. Id. at 7,973 ¶ 14 (emphasis added).
44. Id.
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interpretation of the autodialer provision by suggesting that two forms of
competing interpretations could co-exist.45 The court held that a device
qualified as an autodialer only if it could generate random or sequential
numbers to be dialed, and that a device could still qualify as an autodialer
even if it could only dial numbers from a stored list.46 The court also
determined that the FCC’s expansive interpretation of the word “capacity”
would allow “all smartphones [to] qualify as autodialers because they have
the inherent ‘capacity’ to gain [autodialer] functionality by downloading
an app.”47 The decision in ACA International effectively rendered all FCC
interpretations of what constitutes an autodialer invalid and required that
all future courts review these types of cases de novo—the only Order still
in effect is from 1991. In light of this decision, the FCC solicited
comments on the proper interpretation of what constitutes an autodialer.48
Recently, the FCC issued another Order on a request for clarification
on whether certain peer-to-peer text messaging platforms constitute
autodialers subject to the TCPA.49 The FCC communicated that:
whether the calling platform or equipment is an autodialer turns on
whether such equipment [can dial] random or sequential telephone
numbers without human intervention. If . . . [it] is not
capable . . . without a person actively and affirmatively manually
dialing each one, that platform is not an autodialer and calls made
using it are not subject to the TCPA’s restrictions on
calls to wireless phones.50

The FCC stated that the TCPA “does not and was not intended to
stop every type of call. . . . [I]t was limited only to calls made using an
autodialer or an artificial or prerecorded voice.”51 The FCC indicated that
it would not resolve the dispute over the definition of an autodialer and
45. ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 701–03 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
46. Id. at 703 (rejecting the 2015 FCC Order as it espouses two competing interpretations on
what may constitute an [autodialer]). The court additionally noted that the word “auto” in “autodialer”
would seem to propose that the term as used in 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) would amount to an “automatic”
or “non-manual dialing of telephone numbers [,]” which evidences that the provision meant to bar any
form of human intervention of an autodialer. Id.
47. Id. at 700. The court further stated that “[i]t cannot be the case that every uninvited
communication from a smartphone infringes federal law, and that nearly every American is a TCPAviolator-in-waiting, if not a violator-in-fact.” Id. at 698.
48. See Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau Seeks Comments on Interpretation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act in Light of the D.C. Circuit’s ACA International Decision, CG
Docket Nos. 18-152 and 02-278, Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd. 4,864 (2018),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/cgb-seeks-comment-tcpa-light-dc-circuit-decision-aca-intl
[https://perma.cc/BYW5-GSSL].
49. See Petition for Clarification of the P2P Alliance, CG Docket No. 02-278 at 1 (filed May 3,
2018) (hereinafter P2P Alliance Petition).
50. FCC 2020 Order, supra note 1, ¶ 8.
51. Id. ¶ 12.
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instead would rely strictly on the statutory language of the TCPA.52 It
remains to be seen whether the FCC will offer any interpretation relating
to this issue now that the Court has decided Duguid.
III. CIRCUITS SPLIT ON THE MEANING OF AN AUTODIALER
A. Minority View: Broad Interpretation
The Second and Ninth Circuit Courts, until recently, interpreted the
TCPA’s autodialer provision to not require that a device generate random
or sequential numbers so long as it can store and automatically dial those
numbers. A brief overview of the two cases brought before these circuits
are discussed below to aid in understanding the broad interpretation of the
provision.
1. Second Circuit
In King v. Time Warner Cable Inc., the Second Circuit considered
“whether the . . . broad understanding of the ‘capacity’ a device must have
in order to qualify as an [autodialer] under the TCPA is a supportable
interpretation of the statute.”53 The court relied on the plain meaning of
the word “capacity” to determine that “an autodialer must necessarily
obtain that actual ability before [it] pose[s] a concrete risk of causing the
problems which the statute was enacted to prevent.”54 Interestingly, the
court examined ACA International and noted that the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion did not limit the term “capacity” to a device’s present ability, but
rather proposed that:
whether equipment has the ‘capacity’ to perform the function of an
[autodialer] ultimately turns . . . on considerations such as how much
is required to enable the device to function as an autodialer: does it
require the simple flipping of a switch, or does it
require essentially a top-to-bottom reconstruction of the
equipment?55

The Second Circuit also suggested that easily activated devices, such
as smartphones, could be autodialers under the TCPA.56 Ultimately, it held
52. Id. ¶ 1 n.2.
53. King v. Time Warner Cable Inc., 894 F.3d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 2018). The plaintiff in this case
received 163 calls to her cell phone by Time Warner Cable’s interactive voice response system,
requesting payment on a delinquent account. Id. at 475. All 163 calls King received were actually for
another, apparently delinquent, Time Warner customer whose account was erroneously associated
with King’s phone number. Id.
54. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 478–79 (quoting ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2018)).
56. See id.
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that an autodialer is not limited only to devices with the capacity to call
numbers, but also to devices that have the capacity to dial stored numbers
automatically.57
2. Ninth Circuit
Similarly, in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, the Ninth Circuit
considered whether in order to qualify as an autodialer, a device needs to
dial numbers generated by a random and sequential number generator, or
if it is sufficient that a device merely dials numbers from a stored list; and
to what extent a device must function without human intervention to be
considered an autodialer.58
Marks argued that a device qualified as an autodialer if it has capacity
to store numbers and dial them automatically, whereas Crunch argued a
device must store numbers that are produced using a random or sequential
number generator to qualify as an autodialer.59 The court concluded, after
acknowledging its own struggle with the provisional language, that its
analysis of the plain language alone was insufficient because the text was
ambiguous.60 Looking at the context and structure of the statutory scheme
in its search for clarity, the court explained that Congress had intended to
regulate devices that were capable of automatically calling consumers.61
Although the equipment that the TCPA targets is much different than
equipment in use today, the statutory language supports the idea that
equipment that made automatic calls also fell under the statutory scheme.62
The court concluded that the autodialer definition includes any device that
has the “capacity–(1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce
numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator–and
to dial such numbers.”63 The Ninth Circuit expanded the reading of the
autodialer provision to mean that equipment that can store numbers and
dial them automatically is within the statutory language.

57. Id. at 481.
58. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041(9th Cir. 2018), abrogated by Facebook,
Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021). The plaintiff in this case was a member of a member of Crunch
Fitness (Crunch) gym since 2012, and he received three texts over an 11-month period from Crunch’s
Textmunication system, which is a “web-based marketing platform designed to send promotional text
messages to a list of stored telephone numbers.” Id. at 1048. The plaintiff filed a class action suit
against Crunch after he received charges from his cell phone provider. Id.
59. Id. at 1050–51.
60. Id. at 1051.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1052.
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B. Majority View: Narrow Interpretation
In contrast, the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits—whose
decisions are now aligned with the Supreme Court’s—interpreted the
TCPA’s autodialer provision as requiring a device to have the capacity to
both store or produce numbers using a random or sequential number
generator. Again, a brief overview of the three cases brought before these
circuit courts are discussed below to understand the narrow interpretation
that the Court follows.
1. Third Circuit
In 2018, the Third Circuit in Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc. considered
whether a consumer demonstrated that a device used to contact him had
the present capacity to function as an autodialer.64 The court considered
Dominguez’ four expert reports to prove the present capacity issue but
determined that three of the reports were reiterations of the potential
capacities of the device, which is the exact type of hypothesizing that the
D.C. Circuit had foreclosed.65 The fourth report also failed because it did
not explain how the device “actually did or could generate random
telephone numbers to dial.”66 The court concluded that if a consumer is
unable to prove and offer valid reasoning as to how a device is an
autodialer and could generate random telephone numbers, then that
consumer will lose every time.67
2. Eleventh Circuit
Two years after Dominguez, the Eleventh Circuit in Glasser v. Hilton
Grand Vacations Company, LLC considered how it should interpret the
autodialers’ provisional phrase “using a random or sequential number
generator” and whether the phrase modified both verbs “to store” and “to
produce” or just the latter verb.68 Glasser consisted of two consolidated
cases, where the first plaintiff, Melanie Glasser, received thirteen
unsolicited calls regarding vacation opportunities; the second plaintiff,

64. Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2018). The plaintiff purchased a
cellphone with a recycled phone number that apparently belonged to another Yahoo customer, and the
previous customer had set up a subscription to Yahoo’s Email SMS Service. Id. at 17. The plaintiff
received approximately 27,800 text messages from Yahoo’s Email SMS Service over a 17–month
period. Id.
65. Id. at 119–21.
66. Id. at 120.
67. See id. at 121. Additionally, the Third Circuit explained that while Dominguez suffered a
great annoyance, Yahoo sent those messages because its user gave it consent to do so and not because
of a random number generation. Id.
68. Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2020).

770

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:759

Tabitha Evans, received thirty-five unsolicited calls from a loan servicer
regarding unpaid student loans.69
The court determined that “[c]larity . . . does not leap off [the] page”
of the TCPA’s autodialer provision and in the absence of an ideal
alternative, the court chooses the better alternative, which in this case was
interpreting the phrase to modify both verbs.70 The court based its
interpretation on three factors: (1) the FCC, in its Orders from 1991 to
2003, interpreted the phrase “random or sequential” as modifying both
verbs71; (2) the D.C. Circuit’s ACA International decision, which warned
against extending the TCPA to include smartphones because simple,
“unsolicited call[s] using voice activated software (think Siri, Cortana,
Alexa) or an automatic ‘I’m driving’ text message could be a violation
worth $500”72; and (3) the Ninth Circuit’s take on the phrase, which the
Eleventh Circuit noted has taken upon itself to perform a form of surgery
upon the statutory language rather than an interpretation.73
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that in plaintiff Glasser’s case, the
system that the timeshare marketing firm used was not an autodialer
because it was not squared with the assumption that the device is
automatic.74 In contrast, the court determined that in plaintiff Evans’s case,
thirteen of the prerecorded calls from the loan servicer warranted damages
to Evans, but the remaining twenty-two calls were not supported by
sufficient evidence of a system that possessed the capacity to operate as
an autodialer.75
3. Seventh Circuit
In 2020, the Seventh Circuit in Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc.
interpreted “what the phrase ‘using a random or sequential number
generator’ modifies.”76 Here, Gadelhak received five text messages from
AT&T’s Customer Rules Feedback Tool.77 In its opinion, the court noted
69. Id. at 1305.
70. Id. at 1306.
71. Id. at 1309.
72. Id. (parenthetical in original).
73. Id. at 1311. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit argued that the Ninth Circuit’s argument fails
because it offered no explanation as to why other courts should follow its interpretation as opposed to
reading the provision as applying to a device that randomizes or sequences a dialing order. Id.
74. Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court on the grounds that Hilton
Grand Vacations Company’s system, Intelligent Mobile Connect, required a sales agent to review
telephone numbers and manually click a button labeled “make call” to connect with a potential
consumer. This type of human involvement superseded the bounds of the autodialer
provision. Id. at 1312.
75. Id. at 1312–13.
76. Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 2020).
77. Id. AT&T’s Customer Rules Feedback Tool is device used by AT&T’s customer service
department to deliver surveys to customers following an interaction. The tool itself, like other systems
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four primary interpretations of the phrase “using a random or sequential
number generator” derived from the autodialer provision:
First, the phrase . . . might modify both store and produce, which
would mean that a device must be capable of performing at least one
of those functions using a random or sequential number generator to
qualify as an [autodialer]. . . . Second, the phrase might describe the
telephone numbers themselves, specifying that the definition
captures only equipment that dials randomly or sequentially
generated numbers. . . . Third, the phrase might limit only the word
produce,
which
would
mean
that
the
definition
captures not only equipment that can produce numbers
randomly
or
sequentially,
but
also
any
equipment
that can simply store and dial numbers. . . . [Or f]inally, the phrase
could describe the manner in which the telephone numbers are to be
called, regardless of how they are stored, produced, or generated.78

The Seventh Circuit evaluated each of the differing interpretations
and found all lacking but the first option. With the first interpretation, it
was difficult for the court to understand how a number generator could be
used to store telephone numbers.79 The second interpretation allowed for
the insertion of a significant word that is simply not in the provision:
“generated.”80 If accepted, it would read as “to store or produce telephone
numbers to be called, [generated] using a random or sequential number
generator, and [] to dial such numbers.”81 The court stated that its task is
to interpret the words of the TCPA, not add to them, and “[t]he words of
Congress, as written, [would] not permit this second interpretation.”82 The
third interpretation, which Gadelhak argued, emphasized the “disjunctive
‘or’ in ‘store or produce’ to mean an [autodialer] need not produce
numbers at all,” and all devices with capacities “to store telephone
numbers to be called and to dial those numbers” would qualify as an
autodialer.83 The Seventh Circuit determined that it is unnatural to cut the
statutory language up to where the phrase would modify only the latter
used in the present, “pulls and dials numbers from an existing database of customers rather than
randomly generating them.” Id. at 461. Here, the tool requested the plaintiff to complete a survey in
Spanish; however, he was not an AT&T customer, did not speak Spanish, and was listed on the do not
call list. Id. at 460.
78. Id. at 463–64 (emphasis in original). The first interpretation reflects both the Third and
Eleventh Circuits’ position, the second interpretation best describes the district court’s position in
Gadelhak, the third interpretation describes the Ninth Circuit’s position, and the fourth describes what
some courts have alluded to as a possibility, but none have adopted. Id. at 464.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 465.
81. Id. at 465 (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
82. Id. at 466.
83. Id.
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verb “produce.”84 The fourth interpretation, called for a reading of the
provision as: “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called [] using
a random or sequential number generator; and [] to dial such numbers.”85
However, in the court’s view, the best choice of the four, although
imperfect, was the first.86
IV. DUGUID V. FACEBOOK, INC.
In January 2014, Noah Duguid received sporadic text messages from
Facebook notifying him of an unrecognized IP address attempting to
access his nonexistent Facebook account.87 The text messages contained a
boilerplate template: “‘Your Facebook account was accessed [by/from]
<browser> at <time>. Log in for more info.’”88 Duguid made several
attempts, both by replying directly to the text messages and by requesting
via email that Facebook stop sending him messages; however, the
automated messages persisted until October 2014.89
In response, Duguid filed a class action suit90 alleging that the social
media giant violated the TCPA’s autodialer provision, specifically when
he began receiving text messages from the company’s use of an autodialer
device.91 In his complaint, Duguid argued that: “Facebook maintain[s] a
database of phone numbers and—using a template and coding that
automatically supplied the browser information and time of access—
programmed its equipment to send automated messages to those numbers
each time a new device accessed the associated account.”92
Duguid further alleged that Facebook obtained his phone number,
stored it, and sent automated text messages to that number,93 much in the
way that Facebook normally obtains its users’ phone numbers when a user
84. Id. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit Court was extremely hesitant to allow such a broad
reading of the statute because it believed that without the prior express consent of the recipient of a
text or call, every sender, including private consumers, could be at risk for liability under the TCPA.
Id. at 467.
85. Id. (emphasis in original) (alteration in original). Because neither party advanced this
interpretation nor had any court offered reasoning to support it, the Seventh Circuit gave this
interpretation little weight. Id. at 468.
86. Id.
87. Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in part, 141 S.
Ct. 193 (2020).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Duguid’s class action suit was brought on behalf of two putative classes: “[P]eople who
received a message from Facebook without providing Facebook their cell phone number; and people
who notified Facebook that they did not wish to receive messages but later received at least one
message.” Id.
91. Id. at 1149.
92. Id. at 1150.
93. Id.
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provides it when setting up an account.94 The district court ruled that
Duguid failed to state a proper claim that Facebook sent him messages
using an autodialer device, a prerequisite that triggers the TCPA’s
liability.95
A. Ninth Circuit Calls for Broad Interpretation
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Duguid had adequately
“allege[d] a concrete injury in fact.”96 First, the circuit court reviewed the
TCPA’s history, noting that the TCPA prohibits calls placed using an
autodialer device, which includes messages sent via text.97 The court stated
that in the midst of this appeal, two rulings had shifted the conversation
concerning this issue: ACA International—where the D.C. Circuit rejected
the FCC’s 2015 Order—and Marks—where the Ninth Circuit chose to
“wipe the definitional slate clean, so [it could] beg[in] anew to consider
the definition of an autodialer under the [TCPA].”98
Following the construction it employed in Marks, the Ninth Circuit
held that the “adverbial phrase ‘using a random or sequential generator’
modifies only the verb ‘to produce,’ and not the preceding verb, ‘to
store.’”99 This construction allows for a device to be considered an
autodialer if it has the capacity to store numbers and automatically dial the
number, which means it does not require the ability to produce the number
using a random or sequential generator in addition.100 Relying on this
previously adopted interpretation, the circuit court held that Duguid stated
a plausible claim.101
Facebook, in an effort to affirm its dismissal, argued that (1)
Facebook’s equipment is not an autodialer as defined in the TCPA because
it only makes calls reflexively, not actively as required under the TCPA,102
and (2) the court should acknowledge this distinction to avoid
94. When creating a Facebook account, the website requires a first and last name; a mobile
number or email; a password; a birthdate; and gender classification. See FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/ [https://perma.cc/5HSZ-JPCT].
95. Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1150.
96. Id. at 1153–57. The Ninth Circuit also addressed Facebook’s claim that the debt-collection
exception to the Act is unconstitutional. Id. However, for the purposes of this Note, only the issue
concerning the autodialer provision is addressed.
97. Id. at 1149 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)); see Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d
946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] text message is a “call” within the TCPA.”).
98. Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1149–50 (citing Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 909 F.3d 1041,
1049–50 (9th Cir. 2018)).
99. Id. at 1151.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court determined that Facebook’s equipment falls squarely within the
autodialer definition; the device has the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers
automatically.
102. Id. at 1152.
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encapsulating smartphones in any autodialer definition.103 Facebook
cautioned against following Marks’s broad interpretation because
smartphones, which are capable of both storing numbers and dialing
numbers using built-in automated response technology, like Siri, would be
considered a type of autodialer.104 According to Facebook, if smartphones
are considered autodialers, then using a smartphone to place a call, even if
not using an autodialing function, is a violation the TCPA.105 The circuit
court rejected this argument and reasoned that “[i]t cannot be the
case . . . that every uninvited communication from a smartphone infringes
on federal law, and that nearly every American is a TCPA-violator-inwaiting, if not a violator-in-fact.”106
Relying on textual analysis, Facebook explained that the autodialer
statute requires a device or equipment to “store numbers to be called.”107
Thus, Marks avoids deeming smartphones as a type of autodialer because
Facebook, perhaps like other firms, stores its numbers “to be called only
reflexively . . . as a preprogrammed response to external stimuli outside of
Facebook’s control[,]” as opposed to proactive messaging.108
The Ninth Circuit rejected this construction of the definition because
the autodialer statute does not equate the phrase “to be called” as being the
only purpose for which to store numbers.109 Rather, the device itself needs
to have the “capacity” to store those numbers.110 The court offered several
examples of numbers that are stored for reasons other than “to be called”
and held that there is no silent implication within the statute that
distinguishes between reflexive or active calls.111 Further, even if the court
were to find a distinction between active and reflexive calls, it would not
avoid encapsulating smartphones, since the average American smartphone
user stores numbers “to be called” proactively.112 The circuit court thus
reaffirmed its interpretation of the TCPA’s purpose according to

103. Id. at 1151–52.
104. Id. at 1152. Siri is capable of “mak[ing] calls or send[ing] texts for you whether you are
driving, have your hands full, or are simply on the go.” Siri, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/siri/
[https://perma.cc/JU7P-FGDR].
105. Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1151.
106. Id. (quoting ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (internal quotations
omitted).
107. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1152.
110. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)).
111. Id. Examples of numbers being stored for other purposes include: “shops and restaurants
[that] store numbers to identify customers in their loyalty programs” and “software for customer
relations management [that] stores numbers to help businesses manage their clientele.”
112. Id.
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Congress’s intent,113 and it determined that Duguid alleged a plausible
claim that Facebook used an autodialer when it contacted him via text.114
B. Resolving the Split and Takeaways
Following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, Facebook promptly filed a
petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court in
October 2019.115 The Court granted cert in July 2020, to determine
“[w]hether the definition of autodialer in the [TCPA] encompasses any
device that can ‘store’ and ‘automatically dial’ telephone numbers, even if
the device does not ‘us[e] a random or sequential number generator.’”116
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court, concluded that the phrase
using a random or sequential number generator “modifies both verbs that
precede it (store and produce)], [and it] specif[ies] how [a device] must
either ‘store’ or ‘produce’ telephone numbers.”117 Given that Facebook’s
notification system did not produce or store numbers using a random or
sequential number generator, then it could not be an autodialer.118
The Court’s analysis began with a review of the relevant statutory
language. It relied on the series-qualifier canon, which states: “‘[w]hen
there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or
verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the
entire series[,]’”119 to demonstrate that adhering to this canon offers “the
most natural reading of a sentence.”120 The Court explained this
construction fully in the following example and discussion:
Imagine if a teacher announced that ‘students must not complete or
check any homework to be turned in for a grade, using online
homework-help websites.’ It would be strange to read that rule as
prohibiting students from completing homework altogether, with or
without online support. Here, the series-qualifier canon recommends
qualifying both antecedent verbs ‘store’ and ‘produce,’ with the
phrase ‘using a random or sequential number generator.’121

113. The TCPA’s purpose, according to Congress, is “protecting privacy by restricting
unsolicited, automated telephone calls.” Id. (citing S. Rep. 102–178, at 1).
114. Id. at 1157.
115. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146 (2019) (No.
19-511), 2019 WL 5390116, at *1.
116. Id. at *1.
117. Facebook, Inc., v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021).
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 147 (2012)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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In finding that Duguid’s interpretation was contrary to the plain
reading of the text, the Court held that the definition of an autodialer
requires “in all cases, whether storing or producing numbers to be called,
the equipment [or device] in question must use a random or sequential
number generator.”122
Additionally, the Court noted that an expansion of the autodialer
definition that seeks to encompass equipment, like cellphones, “would
take a chainsaw to these nuanced problems when Congress meant to use a
scalpel.”123 In the Court’s view, Duguid’s interpretation would encapsulate
all modern cell phones, and average consumers could be held liable for
everyday uses such as “speed dialing or sending automated text
message[s].”124 The Court refused to read into the Act any restrictive line
drawing standard that would determine how much human intervention is
too much for a device to qualify as an autodialer.125
Lastly, the Court considered Duguid’s legislative purpose argument
regarding the TCPA. Duguid argued Congress was concerned for
consumers’ privacy and in response enacted broad privacy-protection
legislation.126 The Court did not agree and, in fact, stated that Congress’s
broad concern of telemarketing tactics on consumers did not equate to
enacting a broad definition of what constitutes an autodialer.127 Thus,
Duguid failed not only with respect to the Court’s textualist approach to
the definition of an autodialer, but also in his showing that Congress would
support a broad interpretation of what qualifies as an autodialer.128
V. COMPANIES CONTINUE TO SKATE PAST LIABILITY,
BUT IS THERE HOPE?
Advocates, and now the United States Supreme Court, who argue
that allowing a broadening of the autodialer provision would lead to a
parade of horribles miss the point of the Act. Congress’s aim was to
prevent the onslaught of telemarketers from contacting consumers to the
point of surpassing simple annoyance.129 Smartphone users alleging
122. Id. at 1170.
123. Id. at 1171.
124. Id.
125. See id. at n.6 (explaining that “all devices require some human intervention, whether it takes
the form of programming a cell phone to respond automatically to texts received while in ‘do not
disturb’ mode or commanding a computer program to produce and dial phone numbers at random. We
decline to interpret the TCPA as requiring such a difficult line-drawing exercise around how much
automation is too much.”).
126. Id. at 1172.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–243, § 2 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 227). Congress, at the time of enactment of the TCPA, found that consumers were
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violations of the Act over a single text message or voicemail by another
smartphone user is not sure to follow. The Act should not be taken to
reflect an ability for private citizens to sue one another, but rather a private
right to sue telemarketing and telecommunication companies that use
autodialers. Specifically, sue those companies who otherwise continue to
skate past liability and utilize devices or equipment that store or produce
numbers without using a random or sequential number generator, which is
now required to trigger liability under the Act.
Further, the disagreement and varied interpretations offered by
circuit courts, prior to Duguid, support the notion that action is needed by
Congress to offer clarity on its words. The contentious phrase “using a
random or sequential number generator” spurred a variety of grammatical
and plain meaning arguments, but none of the interpretations offered a
precise fit; even the majority on this split agrees.130
The Second and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation131 of what constitutes
an autodialer would allow devices that either have the capacity to store
numbers and dial them automatically or have the capacity to produce
numbers using a random or sequential number generator and dial them
automatically. By amending the Act with this interpretation in mind,
Congress would ensure that companies using automatic storage and
dialing devices, where numbers have been previously stored and then
automatically dialed by the device, are captured by the Act.
While it is true that a minority of circuit courts did not offer the best
explanation for why their interpretation was the better one, it is clear, from
the facts of those same cases, that ordinary American consumers were the
target of companies utilizing autodialers. At the same time, those
companies were saving themselves from liability on the grounds that their
pre-programmed list of numbers were not generated using a random or
sequential number generator.132 To allow companies and telemarketers to
find loopholes in the Act goes against the very premise of what Congress
“outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers[,]” and
“[i]ndividuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests, and commercial freedoms of speech and trade
must be balanced in a way that protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate telemarketing
practices.” Id. at § 2(6), (9). Additionally, Congress recognized that any technology available at the
time to avoid robocallers would be costly “or place an inordinate burden on [a] consumer.” Id. at
§ 2(11).
130. See discussion supra Section III.B.3.
131. Again, the Second Circuit Court found that a device qualifies as an autodialer if the device
has the capacity, both current and present functions, to act as an autodialer, absent any modifications.
King v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 894 F.3d 473, 481 (2d Cir. 2018). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit took
the approach that autodialer provision should be construed as including any device with the capacity
to dial stored numbers automatically. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2018) cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 1289 (2019).
132. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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sought to do: to protect the privacy interests of consumers from unsolicited
calls and texts from companies without their express consent.133
The definition of an autodialer, as it stands now, is ill-equipped to
protect consumers. If acting alone, a consumer is charged with not only
providing evidentiary support that the device in-fact is an autodialer, but
also that the device either stores numbers using a random or sequential
number generator or produces numbers using a random or sequential
number generator, and then dials those numbers automatically. The odds
are stacked against a consumer, unless and until Congress offers guidance
on what constitutes an autodialer through a broader interpretation. By
allowing the phrase at issue to modify only the verb “produce,” it allows
the Act to capture some of the modern systems of technology, i.e., cell
phones used by companies, rather than only capturing technology that is
rapidly becoming obsolete.
However, the call for help has been heard. Shortly after the decision
in Duguid was handed down, Senator Edward J. Markey (D-MA), one of
the original authors of the Act, and Representative Anna G. Eshoo (D-CA
18) criticized the Court’s ruling and threatened legislative action.134 In a
joint statement, both Senator Markey and Representative Eshoo
denounced the Court for “abandoning consumers” and stated that:
[T]he Supreme Court tossed aside years of precedent, clear legislative
history, and essential consumer protection to issue a ruling that is
disastrous for everyone who has a mobile phone in the United
States. . . . By narrowing the scope of the [Act], the Court is allowing
companies the ability to assault the public with a non-stop wave of
unwanted calls and texts, around the clock. Fortunately, we can and
will act to make right what the Supreme Court got wrong. We plan to
soon introduce legislation to amend the [Act], fix the Court’s error,
and protect consumers. If the Justices find their private mobile
phones ringing non-stop from now until our legislation becomes law,
they’ll only have themselves to blame.135

While these statements signal a call for relief, the reality remains the
same: consumers will be unable to rely on the TCPA to combat
unwarranted robocallers, texts, and emails. Therefore, consumers’ best
133. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–243, § 2(9) (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 227) (“[i]ndividuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests, and commercial freedoms of
speech and trade must be balanced in a way that protects the privacy of individuals and permits
legitimate telemarketing practices.”).
134. Press Release, Senator Edward J. Markey and Representative Anna G. Eshoo, Sen. Markey
& Rep. Eshoo Blast Sup. Ct. Decision on Robocalls as “Disastrous” (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-and-rep-eshoo-blast-supremecourt-decision-on-robocalls-as-disastrous [https://perma.cc/3FSD-7M38].
135. Id.
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option in the interim is three-fold: (1) plaintiffs may still bring claims
against companies they believe are using an autodialer device to target
them, if they can make a capacity argument, and they can additionally
“raise claims under state unfair and deceptive trade practice laws”136; (2)
plaintiffs can await further orders by the FCC that may address Duguid,
and determine whether a device could be considered an autodialer if it only
has the potential capacity to store or produce numbers using a random or
sequential number generator and not the present ability to do so; and (3)
plaintiffs may rely on their cellphone carriers.
Taking option one first, although the Court has impeded the ability
of consumers to bring TCPA claims unless they show that the device at
issue used a “random or sequential number generator” to store or produce
the number that was called, texted, or emailed, a consumer can still argue
that a device that has the potential capacity to acquire that function is an
autodialer.137 Additionally, the Duguid Court notes that an autodialer may
use a number generator to choose phone numbers from a pre-produced
list.138 With appropriate means of obtaining information about companies’
devices and analyzing the devices to determine how they are used, such as
by discovery, a consumer advocate may be able to allege a plausible claim
on behalf of consumers that the device is an autodialer if it is using a
number generator not to produce or store numbers, but to choose from a
completed list of numbers that may not have used a number generator.
Further, forty-three states and the District of Columbia have Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) statutes that are a common tool to
protect consumers from unfair, predatory, or unconscionable business
practices.139 UDAP statutes, which are primarily civil statutes, typically
allow consumers to seek remedies such as return of payments, or
compensation for consumer loss, or an injunction against fraudulent
business practices, and attorney fees.140
136. Robert Van Arnam, TCPA Litigation Update: The Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s
Facebook v. Duguid Decision, WILLIAMS MULLEN: NEWS (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.williamsmullen.com/news/tcpa-litigation-update-aftermath-supreme-courts-facebookv.-duguid-decision [https://perma.cc/ATM5-E7J4]. Van Arnam highlights that in footnote 7 of the
Court’s opinion in Duguid, “the Court provided an example where equipment might still qualify as an
autodialer if it uses a random number generator to determine the order in which to pick phone numbers
from a pre-produced list and stores those numbers to be dialed at a later time.”
137. See Facebook, Inc., v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021). The Court did not address in
Duguid the distinctions between present capacity and potential capacity but instead focused on
Facebook’s notification system’s use, which leaves room for lower courts to weigh in on this issue.
See id. at 1171–72.
138. Id. at 1172 n.7.
139. CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 11 (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
udap/report_50_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K49-PQPE].
140. Id. at 6; see id. at 11 (discussing the practices prohibited by UDAP statutes).
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Next, with respect to option two, any order issued by the FCC can be
appealed directly to a circuit court and may be struck down.141 At the time
of this Note, the FCC has neither announced requests for comments
regarding the Duguid decision or its impact on autodialers nor has it
released any press release regarding the decision.142 However, the lesson
from ACA International must be remembered: any order issued by the
FCC can be appealed directly to a circuit court and may be struck down.143
If and until the FCC issues further guidance, it is important to note the
agency’s efforts within the last year and half, specifically towards
combatting robocalls.144
Finally, option three: plaintiffs can rely on their cellphone carriers to
combat robocallers. Following Congress’s passing of the Telephone
Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act in 2019,145 the
FCC, in March 2020, adopted new rules to combat robocallers146 and
mandated that cell phone carriers implement the STIR/SHAKEN147
standard by June 30, 2021.148 The standard allows for the digital
verification and authentication of calls passing through the complex web
of networks, which would allow phone carriers to verify that a call is in
fact from the number displayed on the caller ID.149 In July 2020, T-Mobile
became the first phone carrier to implement the STIR/SHAKEN standard
when it unveiled its latest software “Scam Shield,”150 which happens to be
141. See Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 463 (2020); see also discussion
supra Part II.
142. See generally CONSUMER AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS HEADLINES, FCC,
https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/headlines/509 [https://perma.cc/EC8C-KQCR].
143. See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also discussion supra Part
II.
144. FCC CALLS ON CARRIERS TO ENSURE FREE CONSUMER TOOLS ARE AVAILABLE TO BLOCK
ROBOCALLS AND ISSUES NEW ROBOCALL CEASE-AND-DESIST LETTERS, FCC (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-371553A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLY7-T9YZ].
145. Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence
(TRACED) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-105, 133 Stat. 3274 (2019) (“deter[ring] robocall violations and
improving enforcement of section 227(b) of the Communications Act of 1934.”).
146. FCC MANDATES THAT PHONE COMPANIES IMPLEMENT CALLER ID AUTHENTICATION TO
COMBAT SPOOFED ROBOCALLS, FEDERAL COMMC’NS COMM’N (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363399A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU79-3RWH].
147. COMBATING SPOOFED ROBOCALLS WITH CALLER ID AUTHENTICATION, FEDERAL
COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication [https://perma.cc/ZR9X-K7DG].
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. T-MOBILE UNVEILS LATEST UN-CARRIER MOVE: SCAM SHIELD—A MASSIVE SET OF FREE
SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT CUSTOMERS FROM RAMPANT SCAMS AND ROBOCALLS, T-MOBILE (July 16,
2020) [hereinafter T-MOBILE UNVEILS SCAM SHIELD], https://www.t-mobile.com/news/uncarrier/scam-shield-protects-customers-from-scams-robocalls [https://perma.cc/64N3-A7WL]; see
also Scam Shield, T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/customers/scam-shield
[https://perma.cc/4TZV-MH4B] (T-Mobile’s Scam Shield offers consumers free “anti-scam
protections like Scam ID, Scam Block, and Caller ID, and is available to all [its] customers].”).
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free compared to other carriers that charge monthly fees for these
protections.151 Though perhaps a drastic measure, consumers do have the
option to switch phone carriers to T-Mobile to combat robocallers; the
network appears to be more effective in identifying other robocallers,152
but it may end up being more of a hassle than simply stomaching the flow
of robocalls.
Until the TCPA has been amended to incorporate cell phones and
devices that are used without need of a random or sequential number
generator to store or produce numbers, then companies using these forms
of autodialers will continue to skate past liability.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court resolved the long-standing circuit split and
appropriately followed the plain-text interpretation of the autodialer
provision. As TCPA claims for calls, texts, or emails made with an
autodialer diminish, however, it is important to note that the Court never
rejected the position that the capacity of device can be potential.153 This
oversight may still leave hope for plaintiffs to argue that a device qualifies
as an autodialer and an entity can be held liable because the device has the
potential capacity as opposed to a present, actual capacity to operate as an
autodialer. Of course, now may seem the perfect time for the FCC to offer
its own interpretation on the Duguid decision. Although, the FCC’s orders
can be struck down, as shown in ACA International, and it is entirely
possible the Court may take up another case concerning potential capacity
versus actual, present capacity.
Last, the Court’s ruling in favor of Facebook, while acknowledging
the narrow interpretation as the better option, leaves us with the obvious
realization that Congress is still ultimately the better commentator in
understanding what it meant when it wrote the Act and all provisions
within it. With respect to amending the statute, it is in Congress’s best
interest to adopt the Second and Ninth Circuits’ minority interpretation on
this issue. With the ever-evolving advancement in technology and
software, it is crucial that Congress adapt its writings to reflect the changes
that telemarketers and companies have chosen to avoid liability, and more
specifically in avoiding action against it with its use of autodialers that
store a list of numbers and call those numbers automatically.
151. T-MOBILE UNVEILS SCAM SHIELD, supra note 150 (“Verizon charges up to $7.99 per
month—nearly $100 a year—for protections including something as simple as Caller ID!”).
152. Id. (citing GLOBALDATA, TAKING ON THE UNWANTED ROBOCALL CHALLENGE:
COMPARISONS AND TESTING OF OPERATOR SOLUTIONS 9, https://www.t-mobile.com/news/
_admin/uploads/2020/07/GlobalData-Report_Unwanted-Robocall-Challenge.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S32Z-XCUM]).
153. See generally Facebook, Inc., v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1171–72 (2021).
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